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FEDERAL INCOME TAX - TAXPAYERS CAN DEFER THE 
GAIN RECOGNIZED ON THE SALE OF THEIR PRIMARY RESI-
DENCE AND DEDUCT DEPRECIATION AND MAINTENANCE 
EXPENSES ON THE RENTAL OF THAT SAME PROPERTY. Bo-
laris v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Taxpayers purchased a house in 1975 that served as their principal 
residence for approximately two and one-half years. 1 In late 1977, they 
moved into a newly constructed home. After the taxpayers unsuccess-
fully tried to sell their first residence,2 they rented it to a tenant at fair 
market value on a month-to-month basis.3 Eight months later, the tax-
payers asked the tenant to vacate the house in hope that the saleability of 
the house would improve if it were unoccupied. 4 Six weeks after the ten-
ant vacated, the taxpayers received and accepted an offer to purchase the 
house. 5 On their tax return, the taxpayers deferred recognition of the 
gain from the sale of the house and took depreciation and other rental 
expense deductions from the income received during the eight month 
rental period of the house. 6 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disal-
lowed the depreciation and expense deductions, and the taxpayers filed a 
prose petition in the United States Tax Court.7 The tax court found that 
the taxpayers' primary motive in renting the property was not for the 
production of income, but rather to sell the property. The court held 
that the taxpayers were not entitled to the depreciation and expense de-
ductions. The taxpayers, however, were entitled to defer recognition of 
gain on the sale of the old residence.8 The United States Court of Ap-
1. Bolaris v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985). 
2. Id. The taxpayers tried to sell their first residence for 90 days. Id. 
3. ld. The taxpayers rented the property to "lessen the burden of carrying the prop-
erty." ld. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. The taxpayers agreed to rent the residence to the purchasers until financing was 
secured. The residence was rented for approximately one month until the sale be-
came final. Id. 
6. Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 843 (1983). The taxpayers' 1978 tax return 
indicated a gain of $20,708.45 on the sale of their old home. The taxpayers received 
and recorded rental income of $1,271 for 1977 and $2,717 for 1978. Using a 
straight-line method, taxpayers claimed that the house had a twenty-seven year use-
ful life and certain appliances left in the house had a ten year useful life. The depre-
ciation deductions taken were $373.00 for 1977 and $1,120.16 for 1978. The 
taxpayers also claimed deductons for expenses attributable to the following: 
Expense 1977 1978 
Mortgage interest $1,505.28 $4,911.68 
Property taxes 252.27 720.32 
Insurance 236.00 
Miscellaneous expense 542.67 692.12 
$2,536.22 $6,324.12 
/d. 
7. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1430. On the day of trial, the IRS filed an amended answer 
stating that if the taxpayer was entitled to deferred gain on the sale of their first 
residence, any depreciation or rental expenses were precluded. ld. 
8. Bolaris, 81 T.C. at 847-50. The court stated that the taxpayers's rentals were "ne-
cessitated by the exigencies of the real estate market, were ancillary to sales efforts 
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peals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the rental of the property for the 
eight month period proved that the taxpayers had a "predominant pur-
pose and intention of making a profit" and reversed and remanded that 
portion of the tax court's decision that denied the depreciation and ex-
pense deductions.9 
Under section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer can 
defer recognition of gain on the sale of his "old residence" 10 provided 
that a "new residence" 11 is purchased either two years before such sale or 
two years after such sale. 12 The intent of section 1034 is to remove the 
hardship associated with residential investment. 13 If an amount equal to 
and [arose] from [their] use of the [old residence] as their principal residence." /d. 
at 847 (citing Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505 (1975)). The tax court con-
cluded that the term "residence," as used in section 1034, was in contradistinction 
to property held for the production of income, as used in sections 167 and 212. The 
court also allowed interest and real estate tax deductions permitted under sections 
163 and 164 of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 850. 
9. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1434. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the tax court 
decision that permitted the deferred recognition of gain. 
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1{b)(1) ("'Old residence' means property used by the taxpayer 
as his principal residence which is the subject of a sale by him .... "). 
11. Id. § 1.1034-1{b)(2) ("'New residence' means property used by the taxpayer as his 
principal residence which is the subject of a purchase by him . . . . "). 
12. Recognition of gain is deferred pursuant to section 1034 of the Code, which states in 
part: 
(a) Nonrecognition of gain. -
If property (in this section called "old residence") used by the tax-
payer as his principal residence is sold by him and, within a period 
beginning 2 years before the date of such sale and ending two years 
after such date, property (in this section called "new residence") is 
purchased and used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, gain (if 
any) from such sale shall be recognized only to the extent that the 
taxpayer's adjusted sales price (as defined in subsection (b)) of the old 
residence exceeds the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new residence. 
{b) Adjusted sales price defined. -
(1) In general. -
For purposes of this section, the term "adjusted sales price" means 
the amount realized, reduced by the aggregate of the expenses for 
work performed on the old residence in order to assist in its sale. 
(2) Limitations. -
The reduction provided in paragraph (1) applies only to 
expenses-
(A) for work performed during the 90-day period ending on the 
day on which the contract to sell the old residence is entered 
into; 
(B) which are paid on or before the 30th day after the date of the 
sale of the old residence; and 
(C) which are -
(i) not allowable as deductions in computing taxable income 
under section 63(a) (defining taxable income), and 
(ii) not taken into account in computing the amount realized 
from the sale of the old residence. 
I.R.C. § 1034 (1985) (Section 1034 has remained unchanged since the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. ). 
13. Section 1034 was added to the Code by section 318 of the Revenue Act of 1951. 
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or greater than the adjusted sales price of an old residence is invested in a 
new residence, no gain on the sale of the old residence is recognized. 14 
Section 1034 applies only if the property sold is considered a "prin-
cipal residence." 15 Property is a principal residence if the taxpayer has 
not abandoned it. 16 For purposes of section 1034, property is abandoned 
if the taxpayer either vacates the residence and shows no intent to return 
or permanently converts the residence into property held for the produc-
tion of income,17 Property is not considered abandoned if the taxpayer 
vacates the residence and shows an intent either to return to the resi-
dence or to sell it within a reasonable amount of time. 18 The legislative 
history of section 1034 supports this analysis: 
The term "residence" is used in contradistinction to prop-
erty used in trade or business and property held for the produc-
tion of income. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the taxpayer 
temporarily rents out either the old or the new residence may 
not, in light of all the facts and circumstances in the case, pre-
vent the gain from being recognized. For example, if the tax-
payer purchases his new residence before he sells his old 
residence, the fact that he rents out the new residence during 
the period before he vacates the old residence will not prevent 
The rationale was explained in the report of the House Ways and Means Committee 
as follows: 
This bill amends the present provisions relating to a gain on the sale of a 
taxpayer's principal residence so as to eliminate a hardship under existing 
law which provides that when a personal residence is sold at a gain the 
difference between its adjusted basis and the sale price is taxed as a capital 
gain. The hardship is accentuated when the transactions are necessitated 
by such facts as an increase in the size of the family or a change in the 
place of the taxpayer's employment. In these situations the transaction 
partakes of the nature of an involuntary conversion. 
H. REP. No. 586, Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (151). 
14. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1034-1 ("On the other hand, if the new residence costs the taxpayer 
less than the adjusted sales price of the old residence, gain is recognized to the 
extent of the difference . . . . "). 
15. Id. § l.l034(c)(3). 
16. See Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345, 353 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 326 F.2d 760 
(2d Cir. 1964) (The taxpayer's use of his farm residence during weekends and holi-
days did not constitute use as a principal residence). 
17. See Boulette v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 350, 357-58 (1967) (Section 1034 was inap-
plicable because the taxpayers showed no intent to reoccupy their home during a 
six-year leave abroad.). See also Rogers v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 318 
(1982). Unable to sell their home, the taxpayers entered into a series of one-year 
lease agreements. The court held that the taxpayers had abandoned the property 
because no evidence had been presented to show "that the dominant motive in leas-
ing the premises was anything more than for the 'business' of producing income." 
/d. at 321. 
18. See Triskov, 29 T.C. 515 (1957) (holding that the taxpayer's home maintained its 
status as a principal residence even though federal rent control regulations pre-
vented the taxpayers from returning to the residence upon their return from military 
service; Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505 (1975) (holding that the taxpayer's 
home maintained its status as a principal residence because the rentals were necessi-
tated by the exigencies of the real estate market). 
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Thus, proof that a residence was temporarily rented will not necessarily 
prove abandonment. 
Several tax court decisions that determined whether a residence was 
abandoned for purposes of section 1034 focused upon whether the tax-
payer intended to reoccupy the residence. For example, after an unsuc-
cessful attempt to sell his home, the taxpayer in Boulette v. 
Commissioner20 rented the home on five separate occasions over a six-
year period.21 Following the expiration of each lease period, the taxpayer 
made efforts to sell the home. The taxpayer eventually sold the residence 
and deferred recognition of the gain from that sale.22 The court recog-
nized that actual occupancy of the home at the time of sale was unneces-
sary to satisfy section 1034,23 but held that the taxpayer was unable to 
defer recognition of gain on the sale of that home because the taxpayer's 
consistent rental and sales efforts combined with six years of non-occu-
pancy gave rise to a presumption of abandonment. 24 
By contrast, the taxpayer in Trisko v. Commissioner 25 rented his 
home for approximately three years in order to maintain it during his 
absence abroad.26 Although tenants made several offers to buy the prop-
erty, the taxpayer refused to sell the property.27 After returning to the 
United States, the taxpayer tried to reoccupy the premises, but was pre-
cluded from doing so because of federally imposed rent control restric-
tions.28 The court held that, although the taxpayer rented the home for 
almost three years, he did not abandon the property; his inability to re-
turn to the home was caused by government regulation. 29 
Similarly, the taxpayer in Barry v. Commissioner 30 also rented his 
home in order to maintain it during his absence abroad. 31 The rental 
19. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1781, 1896. 
20. 48 T.C. 350 (1967). 
21. Roulette, 48 T.C. at 352. 
22. /d. at 352-53. 
23. /d. at 354. 
24. /d. at 357. See also Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 
326 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1964). The taxpayer in Stolk had two residences: a leased 
apartment in New York City, where he stayed during the week, and a home in 
Chappaqua, New York. In 1953 the taxpayer vacated the home in Chappaqua and 
listed it for sale. In 1955, the home was sold and the taxpayer subsequently 
purchased a farm in Virginia. The tax court disallowed nonrecognition of gain on 
the sale of the home in Chappaqua because the court determined that the taxpayer's 
primary residence was the apartment in New York City and not the home in Chap-
paqua. /d. at 355. 
25. 29 T.C. 515 (1957). 
26. Trisko v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 515, 516-17 (1957). 
27. /d. at 516. 
28. /d. at 517. 
29. /d. at 519-20. 
30. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1971). 
31. Barry v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1971). 
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period, however, lasted for six years. Following the lease period, the tax-
payer constructed a new home because of a sudden change in employ-
ment.32 The court held that, although the taxpayer rented the house for 
six years, he did not abandon the property; his failure to return to the 
home was caused by an unexpected change in employment. 33 
Although the taxpayer's intent to reoccupy the residence is relevant 
to a finding of abandonment, it is not determinative. In Clapham v. 
Commissioner, 34 the taxpayer unsuccessfully attempted to sell his 
home. 35 Unfavorable financial circumstances forced the taxpayer to rent 
the premises with an option to purchase the home. 36 The option was not 
exercised, and after the home was vacant for five months, the taxpayer 
again entered into a rental agreement. 37 The taxpayer eventually sold the 
property and deferred recognition of gain on that sale. In allowing the 
nonrecognition of gain, the tax court focused, not on the taxpayer's in-
tent to reoccupy the house, but rather on the taxpayer's intent to sell the 
property.38 The court held that, even though the taxpayer did not intend 
to reoccupy the premises, he did not abandon it. Notwithstanding, the 
primary motive in leasing the premises was to sell the property as soon as 
the market allowed.39 Consequently, a temporary rental period will not 
deprive a home of its character as a principal residence if the taxpayer 
intends to sell the property.40 
Sections 16741 and 21242 of the Code allow deductions for deprecia-
32. /d. at 758-59. 
33. /d. at 760. The taxpayer also rejected several purchase offers and lived in govern-
ment housing during his stay abroad. The court rejected respondent's claim that 
section 1034 was inapplicable because the taxpayer had deducted depreciation and 
maintenance expenses attributable to the rental of the Maryland house from 1960-
66. The court stated, "[t]he fact that petitioner rented the house and claimed deduc-
tions for depreciation and maintenance is not determinative of a conversion to 
'property held for the production of income.' " /d. at 759. 
34. 63 T.C. 505 (1975). 
35. Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 506 (1975). The taxpayers had no inten-
tion of returning to their home. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 507. 
38. /d. at 510. 
39. /d. 
40. /d. at 512. 
41. Section 167 of the Code governs depreciation deducton. I.R.C. § 167 (1985). It 
provides in part: 
/d. 
(a) General rule. - there shall be allowed as depreciation deduction a 
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a rea-
sonable allowance for abso1escence)-
( l) of property used in the trade or business, or 
(2) of property held for the production of income. 
42. Section 212 of the Code governs maintenance deductions. /d.§ 212. It provides in 
part: 
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable 
year-
588 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
tion and maintenance expenses if the property is held for the production 
of income. 43 A personal residence converted to income producing prop-
erty can qualify for these deductions.44 
In Robinson v. Commissioner,45 the taxpayer had made numerous 
attempts to sell her former residence, however, the premises remained 
unoccupied for three years.46 The tax court identified three factors to 
determine whether a residence is held for the production of income.47 
Applying section 121, the predecessor to sections 167 and 212, the court 
held that a residence is held for the production of income if ( 1) the house 
is abandoned by the owner, (2) it is listed for rent or sale, and (3) diligent 
efforts are made to implement the rental or sale of the home. 48 The court 
allowed the deductions because these three factors were met. 49 
Attempts to rent an abandoned former residence are not conclusive 
proof that property is held for the production of income, they are merely 
factors considered by the court. For example, in Newcombe v. Commis-
soner, 50 the taxpayers abandoned their old residence and attempted to 
sell the home through a local realtor. The house remained on the market 
I d. 
(1) for the production or collection of income; 
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held 
for the production of income; ... 
43. I.R.C §§ 167(a)(2) and 212(2) of the 1954 Code are almost identical to their prede-
cessors, §§ 23(1)(2) and 23(a)(2), respectively, which were added to the 1939 Code 
as amended by section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942. See Rev. Act of 1942, ch. 
619, 56 Stat. 798, 819 (1942). 
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.212(h). 
45. 2 T.C. 305 (1943). 
46. Robinson v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 305, 307 (1943). 
47. ld. The court distinguished pre-1942 decisions, in which deductions for deprecia-
tion and maintenance expenses with regard to a private residence were permitted 
only if the taxpayer converted the residence to business property. See, e.g., Morgan 
v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1935). The court also noted a difference 
between a profit-inspired transaction and a transaction that involved the production 
of income. The court stated, "had Congress, in enacting Section 121 intended noth-
ing more than to cover transactions 'entered into for profit' they would have used 
that expression [rather than 'production of income')." Robinson, at 308-09. See 
also Warner v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 167 
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1948). The taxpayer abandoned the property and unsuccessfully 
attempted to rent or sell the property for four years. The court allowed depreciation 
expenses claiming that the property was held for the production of income, but 
disallowed loss deductions from the sale because the Code provisions requiring that 
the transaction be entered into for a profit were not satisfied. ld. at 583. 
48. Robinson, 2 T.C. at 308. · 
49. The taxpayer, however, need not receive income to satisfy this three-factor test. In 
Horrman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 903 (1951), the taxpayer abandoned his old 
residence and made numerous efforts to rent and sell the property prior to its even-
tual sale. /d. at 907. After examining the taxpayer's use of the property prior to its 
discontinuance as a personal residence, and the taxpayer's intent regarding the dis-
position of that property, the court held that even though the taxpayer received no 
income from his efforts to rent or sell the property, it was held for the production of 
income. /d. at 907-08. 
50. 54 T.C. 1298 1970). 
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for approximately one year, yet at no time did the taxpayers attempt to 
rent the property. 5 1 To determine whether the property was held for the 
production of income, the court implemented the following five-factor 
test: (1) whether the house was permanently abandoned, (2) whether the 
house was offered for rent, (3) whether the house was offered for sale, (4) 
whether the house was occupied before it was placed on the market for 
sale, and (5) whether the house was used for recreational purposes.52 
The court focused not upon the taxpayers' attempt to rent the property, 53 
but on the taxpayers' intent to hold the property in order to realize antic-
ipated appreciation in the value of the property. 54 The court held that 
the taxpayers did not satisfy that criterion because they did not seek an 
amount in excess of their investment. 55 
Since the addition of section 18356 of the Code in 1969, some courts 
have used the factors promulgated in the Treasury regulations of section 
183 to determine whether property is income producing.57 Section 
183(c) defines an activity not engaged in for profit as "any activity other 
than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable 
year under section 162 or section 212."58 By implementing section 183, 
Congress intended to distinguish between taxpayers who enter into busi-
ness for the purpose of realizing a profit and taxpayers who engage in 
hobbies to create losses that offset their income. 59 Nevertheless, the tax 
51. Newcombe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1298 (1970). 
52. /d. at 1299-1300. The Newcombe factors expand on those announced in Robinson 
by adding factors (4) and (5). See also Sherlock v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 
383 (1972) (The court held that, based upon the Newcombe factor test, the taxpayer 
converted the property for the production of income). 
53. Newcombe, 54 T.C. at 1301. 
54. /d. at 1303. The court determined that the taxpayer was not seeking to obtain an 
amount in excess of his investment. /d. 
55. /d. Although the sale price of property was in excess of the market value, the court 
claimed that this was an offset against commissions and expenses rather than reali-
zation of profit. The taxpayers adjusted cost basis on the date of conversion. was 
$70,887.39. The property was offered for sale for $70,000.00 and the fair market 
value of the property was $60,000.00. 
56. I.R.C. § 183 (1982) states: 
(a) General rule. - In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual 
or an S corporation, if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduc-
tion attributable to such activity shall be allowed under this chapter except 
as provided in this section. 
57. See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 33 (1979); Jasionowski v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 312, 321 (1976). 
58. I.R.C. § 183(c) (1982). 
59. See Jasionowski, 66 T.C. at 321. Congress provides additional guidance in applying 
section 183: 
In making the determination of whether an activity is not engaged in for 
profit, the committee intends that an objective rather than a subjective 
approach is to be employed. Thus, although a reasonable expectation of 
profit is not required, the facts and circumstances (without regard to the 
taxpayer's subjective intent) would have to indicate that the taxpayer en-
tered the activity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a 
profit. 
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court in Allen v. Commissioner 60 looked to section 183 for guidance in 
determining whether property is income producing. In effect, the Allen 
court equated property used for the production of income with property 
used for the predominant purpose of making a profit.61 
In Bolaris v. Commissioner, 62 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that taxpayers can defer gain recognized on the 
sale of their primary residence and deduct depreciation and maintenance 
expenses from the income produced on the rental of that same prop-
erty.63 Based upon the legislative history of section 1034, the court rea-
soned that the taxpayers could defer recognition of gain even if they 
temporarily rented their old home. 64 Furthermore, the property's status 
as a primary residence is consistent with the taxpayers' desire to convert 
the property temporarily into an income producing asset before its sale. 65 
The court found that the taxpayers satisfied the Newcombe factors be-
cause they permanently abandoned their home and they made several 
offers to rent or sell the property for its actual fair market value. 66 
Bolaris is consistent with both prior case law and the legislative his-
tory of section 1034. To determine whether the property was abandoned, 
the Bolaris court did not focus on the taxpayers' intent to reoccupy the 
premises, but rather on the taxpayers' intent to sell the property.67 
Although the taxpayers' primary motive in renting the old residence was 
S. REP. No. 552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 104, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2134. 
60. 72 T.C. 28 (1979). 
61. Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28 (1979). The court held: 
[T]he standard for determining ... whether an individual is engaged in 
activities for the production or collection of income or for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of 
income so that his expenses are deductible under section 212, is: did the 
individual engage in the activity with the predominant purpose and inten-
tion of making a profit. 
/d. at 33. 
62. 776 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1985). 
63. Bolaris v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985). 
64. /d. at 1432. 
65. /d. at 1433. 
66. /d. The court looked to the fact that the taxpayers actually rented their home at fair 
market value and that such a transaction would normally suggest that the taxpayer 
had the requisite profit motive. The court also noted that the property in question 
had no elements of recreational property, and that the desire to eventually sell the 
property was ancillary to the taxpayer's profit motive during the rental period. /d. 
Contra Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1434 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted 
that section 1034 and sections 167 and 212 are mutually exclusive because a princi-
pal residence, by definition, cannot be held for the production of income. See also 
Sherlock v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 383, 385 (1972). ("It is completely 
understandable that petitioners desired to turn this potential expense 'eater' [the old 
residence] into an income-producing asset during this waiting period [prior to 
sale]."). 
67. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1431; see also Clapham v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 505, 512 
(1975). . 
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to sell the property as soon as the market permitted, 68 the court held that 
the temporary rental did not destroy the home's character as a principal 
residence. 69 This analysis is in accord with the legislative history of sec-
tion 1034: "[T]he mere fact that the taxpayer temporarily rents out 
either the old or the new residence may not ... prevent the gain from 
being not recognized."70 Although the example given to illustrate this 
point refers to the rental of a new residence, the language in the legisla-
tive history suggests that section 1034 should be equally applicable when 
an old residence is rented.71 Furthermore, the purpose of section 1034 is 
to eliminate the hardship incurred by the taxpayer if the difference be-
tween the adjusted basis and the sale price of the house results in a 
gain.72 
Although other courts have applied section 183 to determine 
whether taxpayers should be allowed deductions when renting prop-
erty,73 the Bolaris court held that section 183 was inapplicable.74 Sec-
tion 183 is more appropriately used when the taxpayer is involved in a 
sport, hobby, or similar form of recreation rather than when the taxpayer 
is renting property.75 A taxpayer who rents property should be allowed 
deductions under section 212 if the property is held for the production of 
income.76 The Newcombe factor test is an effective means of determining 
when a taxpayer intends to hold property for the production of income. 77 
Therefore, the proper test for determining whether a taxpayer should be 
allowed deductions when renting property is not section 183, but rather 
the Newcombe factor test. 78 
The dissent in Bolaris asserted that section 1034, and sections 167 
and 212, are mutually exclusive because a principal residence cannot be 
held for the production of income. 79 This conclusion, however, is not 
supported by precedent. 80 In fact, the legislative history of section 1034 
anticipates similar situations and provides for temporary rentals of either 
68. Bolaris v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 840, 845 (1985). 
69. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1432. 
70. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1781, 1896. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
73. See Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28 (1979); Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 
T.C. 312 (1976). 
74. See Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1433 n.5. 
75. See id. 
76. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
77. See Bo/aris, 776 F.2d at 1433. 
78. See id. 
79. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1434: 
80. See Newcombe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1298, 1302 (1970) (To realize a profit, a 
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the old or the new residence.81 Moreover, Congress enacted section 1034 
nine years after the statutory predecessors to sections 167 and 212 were 
enacted and eight years after the Robinson court had held that residential 
property that was abandoned and listed for rent or sale qualified as prop-
erty held for the production of income. 82 If Congress wanted either to 
prevent the use of section 1034 when sections 167 and 212 are applicable, 
or to nullify the effects of Robinson, Congress could have drafted appro-
priate legislation. 83 
Bolaris is consistent with prior case law and with the legislative his-
tory of section 1034. The court recognized that the application of section 
1034 will not automatically preclude application of sections 167 and 212, 
but rather, that the factors promulgated in Newcombe will provide an 
effective means to determine the taxpayer's intent when a taxpayer tem-
porarily rents his old residence prior to its eventual sale. 
KendelL Sibiski 
81. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
82. Bolaris, 776 F.2d at 1432. 
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